In this essay I attempt to refute radical solipsism by means of a series of empirical experiments.
. 2 Kant interpretation is always fraught. However, even sympathetic commentators seem to agree that Kant's argument is problematic, at least if construed as a self-contained argument with the positive conclusion that the external world exists. For charitably amended reconstructions in light of subsequent Kantian texts -excessively charitable, we're inclined to think, and still unsuccessful as proofs -see Guyer 1987 and Dicker 2008 . See also Stroud 1984 and 1994 for a more general critique of Kantian "transcendental" refutations of skepticism. I set aside the Transcendental Deduction in part because its conclusion is not as clearly in conflict with the regularity-governed radical solipsism that is our target as are views in which the regularities of the mind are driven by nonconscious brain processing. (Thanks to Pierre Keller and Houston Smit for discussion.) March 19, 2013 External World, p. 5 you want stronger proof than that?" is really just a refusal to play the intended game. Or we might, with Wittgenstein, try to undercut the very desire for proof. However, none of these responses seems to me to be preferable to actually delivering a non-question-begging proof if one is discoverable. They are all fallback maneuvers. Another type of fallback maneuver, I
think, can be found in those recent versions of contextualism and reliabilism that concede to the radical solipsist that we cannot know that the external world exists, once the question of its existence has been raised in a philosophical context, while insisting that we can still nonetheless have ordinary knowledge of the mundane facts of practical life.
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The historical landscape has been dominated by these two broad approaches. The first approach aims high, hoping to establish with apodictic or deductive or "transcendental"
certainty, in a non-question-begging way, that the external world really does exist. The second approach abandons hope of non-question-begging proofs, seeking in one way or another to make us comfortable with their absence. But there is a third approach, historically less influential, that
has not yet, I think, been adequately explored. Its most famous advocate is Bertrand Russell.
Russell writes:
In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences.... There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of our own life,
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External World, p. 6 than the common-sense hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations (1912, p. 22-23 , emphasis in original).
Russell also states that certain experiences are "utterly inexplicable" from the solipsistic point of view and that the belief in objects independent of us "tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences", and for this reason the evidence of our experience speaks against solipsism, at least as a "working hypothesis" (1912, p. 23-24; 1914, p. 103-104 (1985, 2002) , Jonathan Vogel (1990 Vogel ( , 2005 Vogel ( , 2008 , Christopher Peacocke (2004) , and James Beebe (2009) . However, their efforts tend to focus on powerful-deceiver skepticism rather than radical solipsism (even a deceiver is disallowed by radical solipsism). Also, like Russell, they do not consider specific pieces of solipsistically-available data evaluated scientifically via forward-looking predictive test. See also my discussion of Reichenbach 1938 /2006 and Sober 2011 in Schwitzgebel 2013 . In other words, I aim to do some solipsistic science. There is no contradiction in this, I
think. Skepticism about the external world is one thing, skepticism about induction and scientific reasoning quite another. I aim to see whether, from assumptions and procedures that even a radical solipsist can admit, I can generate experimental evidence for the existence of an external world.
Let me emphasize: I don't hope to prove something from nothing. The skeptic's position is unassailable if his opponent must prove all the premises of any potential argument. All scientific procedures must rest on some background assumptions that are taken for granted. I aim to refute not all of skepticism, but rather only radical solipsism. I aim only to move from solipsism-compatible premises to an anti-solipsistic conclusion. That, I think, would be interesting enough and victory enough. Consequently, for purposes of this project, I don't plan to entertain any more than the usual doubt about (solipsism-compatible versions of) induction or deduction or memory or introspective self-knowledge.
More specifically, I will allow myself to assume the following: Leaning only on these resources, I will try to establish, to a reasonable standard of scientific confidence, the existence of an external world.
If solipsism implies that I have complete control over my stream of experience, it would be easy to refute experimentally. I might, for example, take in my hands a deck of cards (or at least seem to myself to do so) and resolutely will that I draw a queen of clubs. Then I might note the failure of the world to comply with my will. In fact, I have now attempted exactly this, with an apparent ten of diamonds as my result. But unfortunately for the prospects of such an easy proof, solipsism has no such voluntaristic implications and thus admits of no such antivoluntaristic refutation.
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To think through this last issue more clearly, I close my eyes -or rather I do something that seems to me to be a closing of the eyes. What I visually experience is an unpredictable and uncontrollable array of colors against a dark gray background, the Eigenlicht.
This uncompliant
Eigenlicht is entirely compatible with radical solipsism as long as I conceptualize the patterns it contains as nothing but patterns in, or randomnesses in, my stream of sensory experience, 6 Certain remarks of Locke (1689 /1975 , IV.xi) Berkeley (1710 /1965 and Fichte (1797 Fichte ( /2000 suggest a view of solipsism on which the solipsist has full voluntary control of all experience. But such compliant-world solipsism is a flimsy cousin of the more robust version of solipsism I have in view. See also Descartes 1641/1984, Meditations 3 and 6. 7 For more on visual experience with one's eyes closed, including the question of controllability, see Schwitzgebel 2011 , ch. 8. March 19, 2013 External World, p. 11 patterns governed by their own internal coherences rather than by anything further that stands behind them. The unpredictability and uncontrollability of these visual patterns no more compels me to accept the existence of non-experiential objects than irresolvable randomness and unexplained laws in the material world, as I conceptualize it, would compel me to accept the existence of immaterial objects behind the material ones.
What sorts of tests, then, might put radical solipsism at risk? Interpreting this question as straightforwardly as possible, I see three types of potential evidence that would be difficult to accommodate on a solipsistic view: evidence of the existence of something with theoretical reasoning powers that exceed my own, evidence of the existence of something that can retain its properties over a period during which those properties are lost to my sensory experience and memory, and evidence of something with practical reasoning powers that exceed my own.
I will now describe three experiments, all conducted in one uninterrupted episode on a single day. To the extent possible, the remaining text, apart from the final concluding section, reflects real thoughts on the day of experimentation, with a few subsequent modifications for clarity. To fit all of these thoughts into the time-span of a single day, I drafted a version of the material below in the present tense using dummy results based on pilot experiments. I entered into the experiment with the intention of genuinely thinking the thoughts below with real data as the final results came in. Where the results surprised me, I of course had to modify my thinking.
Experiment 1: The Prime Number Experiment.
Method. I have prepared for this experiment by doing something that seems to me to be an instance of programming Microsoft Excel to calculate whether a four-digit number is prime, displaying "prime" next to the number if it is prime and "nonprime" if it is not. Then I did These are hard questions to answer. And yet I don't want to be too hard on myself. I'm looking only for scientific plausibility, not absolute certainty.
One typical kind of pattern in experience, it seems to me, is this: When I do something that feels like shifting my eyes to the left, my experienced visual field seems to shift to the right -a fairly simple law of experience, a simple way in which two experiences might be directly related with no compelling explanatory need of a non-experiential intermediary. Likewise, when I seem to see a spherical thing and then seem to reach out to touch it, I seem also to have tactile experience of something spherical. This pattern is somewhat more complex, and not fully expressible by me, but still it seems a fairly straightforward set of relationships among experiences. It's tempting to think that there must be a genuine mind-independent physical sphere that unifies and structures those cross-modal experiences. by the inner speech experience of saying to myself, with understanding, "twenty-eight thirtyseven" in English, and, on the other hand (b.) the visual experience of suddenly seeing "prime" in the matched column to its right if the number is prime or "nonprime" if the number is nonprime. Such a law would be both semantic and dependent upon facts about primes in a way that I tend to think of as uncharacteristic of scientific laws. In both ways it's quite different from the laws of experience I described in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, such laws would have to work in essentially the same way for Roman numerals too, despite the fact that Roman and Arabic numerals have little in common on the sensory surface. Something in the world seems to be responding, more swiftly than I possibly can, to semantic facts about the primeness of the numbers represented by these different numerals, producing the complex visual shapes "prime" and "nonprime" appropriately in response. Duhem (1906 Duhem ( /1954 , Popper (1934 Popper ( /1959 , Kuhn (1962 Kuhn ( /1996 Given my acknowledged bias against solipsism, though, it would be imprudent to leap too swiftly to the conclusion that solipsism is false from this evidence alone. Maybe this is exactly the sort of law of experience that I should expect on a solipsistic worldview, charitably enough understood. So I have some further experiments in mind.
Experiment 2: Two Memory Tests.
Method. If the external world exists, it might contain a person named Alan, whom I am inclined to think of as my graduate student collaborator. I have arranged with this seeming "Alan" that he test my memory. In the first test, he will orally present to me an arbitraryseeming series of 20 three-digit numbers. He will present this list to me twice. I will first attempt to freely recall items from that list, and then I will attempt to recognize those items from among a 40-item list, half of which consists of new three-number combinations. The second test will be the same procedure with 20 sets of three letters each, and with a two-minute enforced delay to further impair my performance. In both cases, I expect that seeming-Alan will tell me that my memory has been less than perfect. anchor the advertised visual "re-presentation" to the earlier orally-presented lists, apart from my own memory. In those cases, then, where my memory has failed, the supposed "re-presentation"
should not contain a greater number of the originally presented elements than would be generated by chance. I shouldn't be able to step in the same stream twice except insofar as I can remember that stream (though maybe I could have the illusory feeling of having done so). The contents of experience should not have a fixity that exceeds that of my memory, because there is nothing beyond my own experience that can do the fixing. At least, this seems to me the most straightforward prediction from within the solipsistic worldview.
The final move in the experiment will be to confirm that the re-presented list does indeed match the original list despite the gap in my memory. The method of confirmation will be this:
Seeming-Alan will state the procedure by which he generated the seemingly arbitrary lists. By (seeming) prior arrangement, he will have used a simple semantic procedure for the letters and a simple arithmetic procedure for the numbers. (I seem to recall having suggested that he draw his letters from something like the middle three letters of each U.S. state in alphabetical order or that he take a string of text I would recognize and present it backwards, and that he draw his numbers from something like the decimal expansion of 1/n for some n that generates a suitably complicated expansion.) I should then be able to confirm that the later-presented full lists of 20 three-element items are indeed consistent with generation by the claimed procedures. This will in turn suggest that the original lists were also generated by those same procedures. It will do so, if all goes well, because (as I will later estimate) there's only a very small chance that two arbitrary lists of 20 three-element items would have several items in common -the several items I hope to remember across the temporal gap -unless they were generated by the same procedure.
This would then allow me to infer that the entire "re-presented" list does indeed match the entire The thought occurs to me that some of the laws of external-world psychology, as I conceive of it, are also weird and semantical. For example, an advertisement might trigger a tangentially associated memory. But the crucial difference is this: In the case of external-world psychology, the semantic associations, even if not conscious, I assume to be grounded in mundane facts about neural firing patterns and the like. A bare solipsistic tendency to create and then recreate, unbeknownst to myself, the same partial orthography of a famous speech, while meanwhile being unable to produce that partial orthography when I consciously try to do sowell, that's not impossible perhaps, but neither does it seem as natural a development of solipsism as does the view that the stability of experience should not exceed the stability of memory.
My argument would be defeated if I could have easily found some simple scheme, posthoc, that could generate twenty items including exactly those seven recalled numbers and eight recalled letter sets. My anti-solipsistic interpretation requires that there be only one plausible generating scheme for each set; otherwise there is no reason to think the unrecalled items would be the same on the initially presented list as on the subsequently presented list. So, then, what are the odds of a post-hoc fit of seven or more items from each set? Fortunately, very lowabout one in a million, given some plausible assumptions and the mathematics of combination.
13
13 Consider the odds of hitting one specific familiar sentence or one specific numbergenerating sequence. Given 1000 possible three-digit numbers, equally likely, or 1000 equally likely letter sets, the odds of exactly seven matches among the 20 items generated by that Method. Seeming-Alan has, if I recall, told me that he is good at chess. I believe that I stink at chess. Thus, I have arranged to play 20 games of speed chess against seeming-Alan, with a limit of approximately five seconds per move. If solipsism is true, nothing in the universe should exist that has chess-playing practical reasoning capacities that exceed my own, and so seeming-Alan should be unable to defeat me at rates above statistical chance. Figure 3 displays the procedure, as presented to me by a seeming camera held by a seeming Gerardo Sanchez.
specific sentence or number-generating scheme are approximately (1/10 3 ) 7 times 20-choose-7 possible arrangements (about 10 6 ), i.e., approximately one in 10 15 . The odds of 8 or more matches add only negligibly to this probability. Even if we assume a billion possible simple generating schemes along roughly the lines I recall having suggested to seeming-Alan, the odds of a chance match of at least seven items out of 20 to any one of those billion generating schemes remain about one in a million (i.e., 10 9 /10 15 = 1/10 6 ). If I'm aiming to exclude chances of p ≥ .05, that gives me a few orders of magnitude for relaxing the assumptions of this estimate. conclude that Alan exists 15 so that I may call him co-author, and I will do something that seems to me to be the act of circulating this essay for him and others to read.
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15 Seeming-Alan adds: "Eric is correct that I exist. However, it's not clear I should accept that he exists. In the context of this micro-cosmos, I appear to be some sort of chessplaying god, and a god can't reason its way out of solipsism by the paths explored here."
16 For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to James Beebe, Jenann Ismael, Pierre Keller, Noa Latham, Houston Smit, Jonathan Vogel, Chris Yeomans, students in my Winter 2011 senior seminar, and commenters on relevant posts at The Splintered Mind and the Experimental Philosophy blog.
